[New Rule] FirstTimeSeen User Performing DCSync (#2433)

* Create credential_access_dcsync_newterm_subjectuser.toml

* Update credential_access_dcsync_newterm_subjectuser.toml

* Update credential_access_dcsync_newterm_subjectuser.toml

* Update credential_access_dcsync_newterm_subjectuser.toml

* Update rules/windows/credential_access_dcsync_newterm_subjectuser.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <[email protected]>

* Update rules/windows/credential_access_dcsync_newterm_subjectuser.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <[email protected]>

* Update credential_access_dcsync_newterm_subjectuser.toml

* Update credential_access_dcsync_newterm_subjectuser.toml

* Update rules/windows/credential_access_dcsync_newterm_subjectuser.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <[email protected]>

* Update rules/windows/credential_access_dcsync_newterm_subjectuser.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <[email protected]>

(cherry picked from commit cd2307b)

Author: Samirbous

rules/windows/credential_access_dcsync_newterm_subjectuser.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2022/12/19"
+integration = ["windows"]
+maturity = "production"
+min_stack_comments = "The New Term rule type used in this rule was added in Elastic 8.4"
+min_stack_version = "8.4.0"
+updated_date = "2023/02/01"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This rule identifies when a User Account starts the Active Directory Replication Process for the first time. 
+Attackers can use the DCSync technique to get credential information of individual accounts or the entire domain, 
+thus compromising the entire domain.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-system.*", "logs-windows.*"]
+language = "kuery"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "FirstTime Seen Account Performing DCSync"
+note = """## Setup
+
+The 'Audit Directory Service Changes' logging policy must be configured for (Success, Failure).
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Policies >
+Windows Settings >
+Security Settings >
+Advanced Audit Policies Configuration >
+Audit Policies >
+DS Access >
+Audit Directory Service Changes (Success,Failure)
+```
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
+"""
+references = [
+    "https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/06_credential_access/WIN-180815210510.html",
+    "https://threathunterplaybook.com/library/windows/active_directory_replication.html?highlight=dcsync#directory-replication-services-auditing",
+    "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_ad_replication_non_machine_account.yml",
+    "https://github.com/atc-project/atomic-threat-coverage/blob/master/Atomic_Threat_Coverage/Logging_Policies/LP_0027_windows_audit_directory_service_access.md",
+    "https://attack.stealthbits.com/privilege-escalation-using-mimikatz-dcsync",
+    "https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/credentials/dumping/dcsync",
+]
+risk_score = 73
+rule_id = "5c6f4c58-b381-452a-8976-f1b1c6aa0def"
+severity = "high"
+tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Windows", "Threat Detection", "Credential Access", "Active Directory"]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "new_terms"
+
+query = '''
+event.action : "Directory Service Access" and event.code : "4662" and 
+ winlog.event_data.Properties : (*DS-Replication-Get-Changes* or *DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All* or *DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set* or *1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2* or *1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2* or *89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c*) and 
+ not winlog.event_data.SubjectUserName : (*$ or MSOL_*)
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1003"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/"
+name = "OS Credential Dumping"
+
+    [[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+    id = "T1003.006"
+    reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/006/"
+    name = "DCSync"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0006"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
+name = "Credential Access"
+
+
+[rule.new_terms]
+field = "new_terms_fields"
+value = ["winlog.event_data.SubjectUserName"]
+
+[[rule.new_terms.history_window_start]]
+field = "history_window_start"
+value = "now-15d"