[New Rule] PE through Writable Docker Socket (#2958)

* [New Rule] PE through Writable Docker Socket

* simplified query

* Update privilege_escalation_writable_docker_socket.toml

* Update privilege_escalation_writable_docker_socket.toml

* Update rules/linux/privilege_escalation_writable_docker_socket.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <[email protected]>

Author: Aegrah

rules/linux/privilege_escalation_writable_docker_socket.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2023/07/25"
+integration = ["endpoint"]
+maturity = "production"
+min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
+min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
+updated_date = "2023/07/25"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This rule monitors for the usage of Docker runtime sockets to escalate privileges on Linux systems. Docker sockets by 
+default are only be writable by the root user and docker group. Attackers that have permissions to write to these 
+sockets may be able to create and run a container that allows them to escalate privileges and gain further access onto 
+the host file system.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Potential Privilege Escalation through Writable Docker Socket"
+references = ["https://book.hacktricks.xyz/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/docker-security/docker-breakout-privilege-escalation#automatic-enumeration-and-escape"]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "7acb2de3-8465-472a-8d9c-ccd7b73d0ed8"
+severity = "medium"
+tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Linux", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Privilege Escalation", "Domain: Container"]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and 
+(
+  (process.name == "docker" and process.args : "run" and process.args : "-it"  and 
+   process.args : ("unix://*/docker.sock", "unix://*/dockershim.sock")) or 
+  (process.name == "socat" and process.args : ("UNIX-CONNECT:*/docker.sock", "UNIX-CONNECT:*/dockershim.sock"))
+) and not user.Ext.real.id : "0" and not group.Ext.real.id : "0"
+'''
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1611"
+name = "Escape to Host"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611/"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0004"
+name = "Privilege Escalation"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"