@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ Update the previous EQL query as follows:
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* Change the `any` keyword to `process`. This limits matches to events with an
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`event.category` of `process`.
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- * Add the `and process.command_line != null` condition to match only
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+ * Add the `and process.command_line.keyword != null` condition to match only
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events with a command line value.
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You'll also need to remove the `filter_path=-hits.events` query parameter. This
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ lets you retrieve the document source for any matching events.
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GET /my-index-000001/_eql/search
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{
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"query": """
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- process where process.name == "regsvr32.exe" and process.command_line != null
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+ process where process.name == "regsvr32.exe" and process.command_line.keyword != null
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"""
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}
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----
@@ -142,8 +142,8 @@ GET /my-index-000001/_eql/search
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The query matches one process event. The event has an `event.type` of
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`creation`, indicating the start of a `regsvr32.exe` process.
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- Based on the `process.command_line` value, `regsvr32.exe` used `scrobj.dll` to
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- register a script, `RegSvr32.sct`. This fits the behavior of a
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+ Based on the `process.command_line` value in the response , `regsvr32.exe` used
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+ `scrobj.dll` to register a script, `RegSvr32.sct`. This fits the behavior of a
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https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/["Squiblydoo" attack], a known
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variant of `regsvr32` misuse.
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@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ malicious script, `RegSvr32.sct`. Next, see if `regsvr32.exe` later loads the
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Modify the previous EQL query as follows:
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* Change the `process` keyword to `library`.
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- * Replace the `process.command_line != null` condition with
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+ * Replace the `process.command_line.keyword != null` condition with
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`dll.name == "scrobj.dll`.
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[source,console]
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