Add redundant blinded HTLC failure check for posterity.

Although this new check is unreachable right now, it helps prevent potential
future errors where we incorrectly fail blinded HTLCs with an unblinded error.

Author: valentinewallace

lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs

@@ -2985,11 +2985,12 @@ where
 			msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
 		)?;
 
-		let is_blinded = match next_hop {
+		let is_intro_node_forward = match next_hop {
 			onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
+				// TODO: update this when we support blinded forwarding as non-intro node
 				next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward { .. }, ..
 			} => true,
-			_ => false, // TODO: update this when we support receiving to multi-hop blinded paths
+			_ => false,
 		};
 
 		macro_rules! return_err {
@@ -2999,7 +3000,17 @@ where
 						WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
 						"Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg
 					);
-					let (err_code, err_data) = if is_blinded {
+					// If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
+					if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
+						return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
+							channel_id: msg.channel_id,
+							htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
+							sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
+							failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
+						}));
+					}
+
+					let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_forward {
 						(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
 					} else { ($err_code, $data) };
 					return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {