Merge pull request #7764 from tmorriso-rh/enterprise-3.3

[enterprise-3.3] Removed section for 3.3 and 3.4 guides

Author: Traci Morrison

architecture/core_concepts/routes.adoc

@@ -1039,71 +1039,4 @@ $ oc expose service/<name> --hostname="api.openshift.org"
 $ oc expose service/<name> --hostname="m.api.openshift.org"
 $ oc expose service/<name> --hostname="kates.net"
 $ oc expose service/<name> --hostname="api.kates.net"
-----
-
-
-[[disable-namespace-ownership-check]]
-== Disabling the Namespace Ownership Check
-
-Hosts and subdomains are owned by the namespace of the route that first
-makes the claim. Other routes created in the namespace can make claims on
-the subdomain. All other namespaces are prevented from making claims on
-the claimed hosts and subdomains. The namespace that owns the host also
-owns all paths associated with the host, for example `*_www.abc.xyz/path1_*`.
-
-For example, if the host `*_www.abc.xyz_*` is not claimed by any route.
-Creating route `r1` with host `*_www.abc.xyz_*` in namespace `ns1` makes
-namespace `ns1` the owner of host `*_www.abc.xyz_*` and subdomain `abc.xyz`
-for wildcard routes. If another namespace, `ns2`, tries to create a route
-with say a different path `*_www.abc.xyz/path1/path2_*`, it would fail
-because a route in another namespace (`ns1` in this case) owns that host.
-
-With wildcard routes the namespace that owns the subdomain owns all hosts in the subdomain.
-If a namespace owns subdomain `*abc.xyz*` as in the above example,
-another namespace cannot claim `z.abc.xyz`.
-
-By disabling the namespace ownership rules, you can disable these restrictions
-and allow hosts (and subdomains) to be claimed across namespaces.
-
-[WARNING]
-====
-If you decide to disable the namespace ownership checks in your router,
-be aware that this allows end users to claim ownership of hosts
-across namespaces. While this change can be desirable in certain
-development environments, use this feature with caution in production
-environments, and ensure that your cluster policy has locked down untrusted end
-users from creating routes.
-====
-
-For example, with `ROUTER_DISABLE_NAMESPACE_OWNERSHIP_CHECK=true`, if
-namespace `ns1` creates the oldest route `r1`  `*_www.abc.xyz_*`,  it owns only
-the hostname (+ path).  Another namespace can create a wildcard route
-even though it does not have the oldest route in that subdomain (`abc.xyz`)
-and we could potentially have other namespaces claiming other
-non-wildcard overlapping hosts (for example, `foo.abc.xyz`, `bar.abc.xyz`,
-`baz.abc.xyz`) and their claims would be granted.
-
-Any other namespace (for example, `ns2`) can now create
-a route `r2`  `*_www.abc.xyz/p1/p2_*`,  and it would be admitted.  Similarly
-another namespace (`ns3`) can also create a route  `wildthing.abc.xyz`
-with a subdomain wildcard policy and it can own the wildcard.
-
-As this example demonstrates, the policy `ROUTER_DISABLE_NAMESPACE_OWNERSHIP_CHECK=true` is more
-lax and allows claims across namespaces.  The only time the router would
-reject a route with the namespace ownership disabled is if the host+path
-is already claimed.
-
-For example, if a new route `rx` tries to claim `*_www.abc.xyz/p1/p2_*`, it
-would be rejected as route `r2` owns that host+path combination.  This is true whether route `rx`
-is in the same namespace or other namespace since the exact host+path is already claimed.
-
-This feature can be set during router creation or by setting an environment
-variable in the router's deployment configuration.
-
-----
-$ oadm router ... --disable-namespace-ownership-check=true
-----
-
-----
-$ oc env dc/router ROUTER_DISABLE_NAMESPACE_OWNERSHIP_CHECK=true
-----
+----