diff --git a/Lib/multiprocessing/connection.py b/Lib/multiprocessing/connection.py
index 65303d29f51f8f..b08144f7a1a169 100644
--- a/Lib/multiprocessing/connection.py
+++ b/Lib/multiprocessing/connection.py
@@ -73,11 +73,6 @@ def arbitrary_address(family):
     if family == 'AF_INET':
         return ('localhost', 0)
     elif family == 'AF_UNIX':
-        # Prefer abstract sockets if possible to avoid problems with the address
-        # size.  When coding portable applications, some implementations have
-        # sun_path as short as 92 bytes in the sockaddr_un struct.
-        if util.abstract_sockets_supported:
-            return f"\0listener-{os.getpid()}-{next(_mmap_counter)}"
         return tempfile.mktemp(prefix='listener-', dir=util.get_temp_dir())
     elif family == 'AF_PIPE':
         return tempfile.mktemp(prefix=r'\\.\pipe\pyc-%d-%d-' %
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-09-07-10-42-00.gh-issue-97514.Yggdsl.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-09-07-10-42-00.gh-issue-97514.Yggdsl.rst
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000000..02d95b570520df
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-09-07-10-42-00.gh-issue-97514.Yggdsl.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+On Linux the :mod:`multiprocessing` module returns to using filesystem backed
+unix domain sockets for communication with the *forkserver* process instead of
+the Linux abstract socket namespace.  Only code that chooses to use the
+:ref:`"forkserver" start method <multiprocessing-start-methods>` is affected.
+
+Abstract sockets have no permissions and could allow any user on the system in
+the same `network namespace
+<https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/network_namespaces.7.html>`_ (often the
+whole system) to inject code into the multiprocessing *forkserver* process.
+This was a potential privilege escalation. Filesystem based socket permissions
+restrict this to the *forkserver* process user as was the default in Python 3.8
+and earlier.
+
+This prevents Linux `CVE-2022-42919
+<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-42919>`_.