[New Rule] Potential Suspicious DebugFS Root Device Access #2982
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Aegrah
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Rule: New
brokensound77
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Aug 2, 2023
Aegrah
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Aug 3, 2023
protectionsmachine
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Aug 3, 2023
* [New Rule] Potential DebugFS Privilege Escalation * Changed rule name * Update rules/linux/privilege_escalation_sda_disk_mount_non_root.toml --------- Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 4bcec33)
protectionsmachine
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Aug 3, 2023
* [New Rule] Potential DebugFS Privilege Escalation * Changed rule name * Update rules/linux/privilege_escalation_sda_disk_mount_non_root.toml --------- Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 4bcec33)
protectionsmachine
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Aug 3, 2023
* [New Rule] Potential DebugFS Privilege Escalation * Changed rule name * Update rules/linux/privilege_escalation_sda_disk_mount_non_root.toml --------- Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 4bcec33)
protectionsmachine
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Aug 3, 2023
* [New Rule] Potential DebugFS Privilege Escalation * Changed rule name * Update rules/linux/privilege_escalation_sda_disk_mount_non_root.toml --------- Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 4bcec33)
protectionsmachine
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Aug 3, 2023
* [New Rule] Potential DebugFS Privilege Escalation * Changed rule name * Update rules/linux/privilege_escalation_sda_disk_mount_non_root.toml --------- Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 4bcec33)
protectionsmachine
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Aug 3, 2023
* [New Rule] Potential DebugFS Privilege Escalation * Changed rule name * Update rules/linux/privilege_escalation_sda_disk_mount_non_root.toml --------- Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 4bcec33)
protectionsmachine
pushed a commit
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Aug 3, 2023
* [New Rule] Potential DebugFS Privilege Escalation * Changed rule name * Update rules/linux/privilege_escalation_sda_disk_mount_non_root.toml --------- Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 4bcec33)
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Summary
This rule monitors for the usage of the built-in Linux DebugFS utility to access a disk device without root permissions. Linux users that are part of the "disk" group have sufficient privileges to access all data inside of the machine through DebugFS. Attackers may leverage DebugFS in conjunction with "disk" permissions to read sensitive files owned by root, such as the shadow file, root ssh private keys or other sensitive files that may allow them to further escalate privileges.
Detection
0 hits in RedSector last 365 days. The
diskgroup might be leveraged by system administrators to create backups without granting the user root permissions. The DebugFS utility will most likely not be frequently used for this. By looking for this process and filtering onnot user.Ext.real.id : "0"I think we can reduce most FPs, and final FPs could be eliminated by customer's themselves by adding specific actions to the exclusion list.